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Abstract. Default logic is one of the most popular and successful formalisms
for non-monotonic reasoning. In 2002, Bonatti and Olivetti introduced several
sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical reasoning in propositional default
logic. In this paper we examine these calculi from a proof-complexity perspec-
tive. In particular, we show that the calculus for credulous reasoning obeys
almost the same bounds on the proof size as Gentzen’s system LK . Hence prov-
ing lower bounds for credulous reasoning will be as hard as proving lower bounds
for LK . On the other hand, we show an exponential lower bound to the proof
size in Bonatti and Olivetti’s enhanced calculus for skeptical default reasoning.
1 Introduction
Trying to understand the nature of human reasoning has been one of the most
fascinating adventures since ancient times. It has long been argued that due
to its monotonicity, classical logic is not adequate to express the ﬂexibility of
common-sense reasoning. To overcome this deﬁciency, a number of formalisms
have been introduced (cf. [21]), of which Reiter’s default logic [22] is one of the
most popular and widely used systems. Default logic extends the usual logical
(ﬁrst-order or propositional) derivations by patterns for default assumptions.
These are of the form “in the absence of contrary information, assume . . . ”.
Reiter argued that his logic adequately formalizes human reasoning under the
closed world assumption. Today default logic is widely used in artiﬁcial intelli-
gence and computational logic.
The semantics and the complexity of default logic have been intensively
studied during the last decades (cf. [8] for a survey). In particular, Gottlob [14]
has identiﬁed and studied two reasoning tasks for propositional default logic:
the credulous and the skeptical reasoning problem which can be understood as
analogues of the classical problems SAT and TAUT. Due to the stronger ex-
pressibility of default logic, however, credulous and skeptical reasoning become
harder than their classical counterparts—they are complete for the second level
Σp2 and Π
p
2 of the polynomial hierarchy, respectively [14].
Less is known about the complexity of proofs in default logic. While there
is a rich body of results for propositional proof systems (cf. [18]), proof com-
plexity of non-classical logics has only recently attracted more attention, and
★ An extended abstract of this article appeared in the proceedings of the conference SAT’10
[3]. Research was supported by DFG grants KO 1053/5-2 and VO 630/6-2, by a grant from
the John Templeton Foundation, and by the Marie Curie FP7 Initial Training Network
MALOA (no. 238381).
a number of exciting results have been obtained for modal and intuitionistic
logics [15–17]. Starting with Reiter’s work [22], several proof-theoretic methods
have been developed for default logic (cf. [1,12,19,20,23] and [10] for a survey).
However, most of these formalisms employ external constraints to model non-
monotonic deduction and thus cannot be considered purely axiomatic (cf. [11]
for an argument). This was achieved by Bonatti and Olivetti [5] who designed
simple and elegant sequent calculi for credulous and skeptical default reasoning.
Subsequently, Egly and Tompits [11] extended Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculi to
ﬁrst-order default logic and showed a speed-up of these calculi over classical
ﬁrst-order logic, i.e., they construct sequences of ﬁrst-order formulae which
need long classical proofs but have short derivations using default rules.
In the present paper we investigate the original calculi of Bonatti and
Olivetti [5] from a proof-complexity perspective. Apart from some preliminary
observations in [5], this comprises, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst comprehensive
study of lengths of proofs in propositional default logic. Our results can be
summarized as follows. Bonatti and Olivetti’s credulous default calculus BOcred
obeys almost the same bounds to the proof size as Gentzen’s propositional se-
quent calculus LK , i.e., we show that upper bounds to the proof size in both
calculi are polynomially related. The same result also holds for the proof length
(the number of steps in the system). Thus, proving lower bounds to the size
of BOcred will be as hard as proving lower bounds to LK (or, equivalently,
to Frege systems), which constitutes a major challenge in propositional proof
complexity [6,18]. This result also has implications for automated theorem prov-
ing. Namely, we transfer the non-automatizability result of Bonet, Pitassi, and
Raz [7] for Frege systems to default logic: BOcred -proofs cannot be eﬃciently
generated, unless factoring integers is possible in polynomial time.
While already BOcred appears to be a strong proof system for credulous de-
fault reasoning, admitting very concise proofs, we also exhibit a general method
of how to construct a proof system Cred(푃 ) for credulous reasoning from a
propositional proof system 푃 . This system Cred(푃 ) bears the same relation to
푃 with respect to proof size as BOcred does to LK . Thus, choosing for exam-
ple 푃 as extended Frege might lead to stronger proof systems for credulous
reasoning.
For skeptical reasoning, the situation is diﬀerent. Bonatti and Olivetti [5]
construct two proof systems for this task. While they already show an exponen-
tial lower bound for their ﬁrst skeptical calculus, we obtain also an exponential
lower bound to the proof length in their enhanced skeptical calculus.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we start with some background
information on proof systems and default logic. The calculi of Bonatti and
Olivetti [5] consist of four main ingredients: classical sequents, antisequents to
refute non-tautologies, a residual calculus, and default rules. Thus we start our
investigation in Sect. 3 by analyzing the preliminary antisequent and residual
calculi. Our main results on the proof complexity of credulous and skeptical
default reasoning follow in Sects. 4 and 5, respectively. In Sect. 6, we conclude
with a discussion and some open questions.
2
2 Preliminaries
We assume familiarity with propositional logic and basic notions from com-
plexity theory (cf. [18]). By ℒ we denote the set of all propositional formulae
over some ﬁxed standard set of connectives. For 푇 ⊆ ℒ, the set of all logical
consequences of 푇 will be denoted by 푇ℎ(푇 ).
2.1 Proof Systems
Cook and Reckhow [9] deﬁned the notion of a proof system for an arbitrary
language 퐿 as a polynomial-time computable function 푓 with range 퐿. A string
푤 with 푓(푤) = 푥 is called an 푓 -proof for 푥 ∈ 퐿. Proof systems for 퐿 = TAUT
are called propositional proof systems. The sequent calculus LK of Gentzen [13]
is one of the most important and best studied propositional proof systems. It is
well known that LK and Frege systems mutually p-simulate each other(cf. [18]).
There are two measures which are of primary interest in proof complexity.
The ﬁrst is the minimal size of an 푓 -proof for some given element 푥 ∈ 퐿. To
make this precise, let 푠푓 (푥) = min{∣푤∣ ∣ 푓(푤) = 푥} and 푠푓 (푛) = max{푠푓 (푥) ∣
∣푥∣ ≤ 푛}. We say that the proof system 푓 is 푡-bounded if 푠푓 (푛) ≤ 푡(푛) for all
푛 ∈ ℕ. If 푡 is a polynomial, then 푓 is called polynomially bounded. Another
interesting parameter of a proof is the length deﬁned as the number of proof
steps. This measure only makes sense for proof systems where proofs consist
of lines containing formulae or sequents. This is the case for LK and most
systems studied in this paper. For such a system 푓 , we let 푡푓 (휑) = min{푘 ∣
푓(휋) = 휑 and 휋 uses 푘 steps} and 푡푓 (푛) = max{푡푓 (휑) ∣ ∣휑∣ ≤ 푛}. Obviously, it
holds that 푡푓 (푛) ≤ 푠푓 (푛), but the two measures are even polynomially related
for a number of natural systems as extended Frege (cf. [18]).
For sequent calculi one distinguishes between dag-like and tree-like proofs
where in the latter notion each derived sequent can be used at most once as a
prerequisite of a rule. While for LK these two measures are equivalent [18], we
will concentrate here only on the stronger dag-like model.
2.2 Default Logic
Default logic is an extension of classical logic that has been proposed by Reiter
[22]. The logic is non-monotonic in the sense that an increase in information
may decrease the number of consequences. A default theory ⟨푊,퐷⟩ consists of
a set 푊 of propositional sentences and a set 퐷 of defaults. A default (rule) 훿 is
an inference rule of the form 훼 : 훽
훾
, where 훼 and 훾 are propositional formulae
and 훽 is a set of propositional formulae. The prerequisite 훼 is also referred to as
푝(훿), the formulae in 훽 are called justiﬁcations (referred to as 푗(훿)), and 훾 is the
conclusion that is referred to as 푐(훿). Stable extensions are originally deﬁned in
terms of a ﬁxed-point equation [22], but we use the following characterization
as a starting deﬁnition:
Theorem 1 (Reiter [22]). Let 퐸 ⊆ ℒ be a set of formulae and ⟨푊,퐷⟩ be a
default theory. Furthermore let 퐸0 = 푊, and
퐸푖+1 = 푇ℎ(퐸푖) ∪ {푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐷,퐸푖 ⊢ 푝(훿),¬푗(훿) ∩ 퐸 = ∅} ,
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where ¬푗(훿) denotes the set of all negated sentences contained in 푗(훿). Then 퐸
is a (stable) extension of ⟨푊,퐷⟩ if and only if 퐸 = ∪푖∈ℕ퐸푖.
A default theory ⟨푊,퐷⟩ can have none or several stable extensions (cf. [2,14]
for examples). A sentence 휓 ∈ ℒ is credulously entailed by ⟨푊,퐷⟩ if 휓 holds in
some stable extension of ⟨푊,퐷⟩. If 휓 holds in every extension of ⟨푊,퐷⟩, then
휓 is skeptically entailed by ⟨푊,퐷⟩.
Default rules with empty justiﬁcation are called residues. We use the nota-
tion ℒres = ℒ∪
{
훼
훾 ∣ 훼, 훾 ∈ ℒ
}
for the set of all formulae and residues. Residues
can be used to alternatively characterize stable extensions. For a set 퐷 of de-
faults and 퐸 ⊆ ℒ let 푅퐸푆(퐷,퐸) =
{
푝(훿)
푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐷, 퐸 ∩ ¬푗(훿) = ∅
}
. Appar-
ently, 푅퐸푆(퐷,퐸) is a set of residues. We can then build stable extensions via
the following closure operator. For a set 푅 of residues we deﬁne 퐶푙0(푊,푅) =
푊 and 퐶푙푖+1(푊,푅) = 푇ℎ(퐶푙푖(푊,푅)) ∪
{
훾 ∣ 훼훾 ∈ 푅,훼 ∈ 푇ℎ(퐶푙푖(푊,푅))
}
. Let
퐶푙(푊,푅) =
∪∞
푖=0퐶푙푖(푊,푅). Then we obtain for the sets 퐸푖 from Theorem 1:
Proposition 2 (Bonatti, Olivetti [5]). Let ⟨푊,퐷⟩ be a default theory and
let 퐸 ⊆ ℒ. Then 퐸푖 = 퐶푙푖(푊,푅퐸푆(퐷,퐸)) for all 푖 ∈ ℕ. In particular, 퐸 is a
stable extension of ⟨푊,퐷⟩ if and only if 퐸 = 퐶푙(푊,푅퐸푆(퐷,퐸)).
If 퐷 only contains residues, then there is an easier way of characterizing 퐶푙:
Lemma 3 (Bonatti, Olivetti [5]). For 퐷 ⊆ ℒres ∖ ℒ, 푊 ⊆ ℒ, and for 푖 ∈ ℕ
let 퐶0 = 푊 and 퐶푖+1 = 퐶푖 ∪
{
훾 ∣ 훼훾 ∈ 퐷,훼 ∈ 푇ℎ(퐶푖)
}
. Then 훾 ∈ 퐶푙(푊,퐷) if
and only if there exists 푘 ∈ ℕ with 훾 ∈ 푇ℎ(퐶푘).
3 Complexity of the Antisequent and Residual Calculi
Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculi for default logic use four main ingredients: usual
propositional sequents and rules of LK , antisequents to refute formulae, residual
rules, and default rules. In this section we will investigate the complexity of the
antisequent calculus AC and the residual calculus RC .
We start with the deﬁnition of Bonatti’s antisequent calculus AC from [4].
A related refutation calculus for ﬁrst-order logic was previously developed by
Tiomkin [24]. In AC we use antisequents 훤 ⊬ 훥, where 훤,훥 ⊆ ℒ. Intuitively,
훤 ⊬ 훥 means that
⋁
훥 does not follow from
⋀
훤 . Axioms of AC are all sequents
훤 ⊬ 훥, where 훤 and 훥 are disjoint sets of propositional variables. The inference
rules of AC are shown in Fig. 1. For this calculus, Bonatti [4] shows:
Theorem 4 (Bonatti [4]). The calculus AC is sound and complete.
Concerning the size of proofs in the antisequent calculus we observe:
Proposition 5. The antisequent calculus AC is polynomially bounded.
Proof. Observe that the calculus contains only unary inference rules, each of
which reduces the logical complexity of one of the contained formulae (if per-
ceived bottom-up). Thus each use of an inference rule decrements the size of
the formulae by at least one. After a linear number of steps we end up with only
propositional variables which we cannot reduce any further. Each antisequent
is of linear size, hence the complete derivation has quadratic size. ⊓⊔
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훤 ⊬ 훴,훼
(¬ ⊬)
훤,¬훼 ⊬ 훴
훤,훼 ⊬ 훴
(⊬ ¬)
훤 ⊬ 훴,¬훼
훤, 훼, 훽 ⊬ 훴
(∧ ⊬)
훤, 훼 ∧ 훽 ⊬ 훴
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼
(⊬ ∙∧)
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼 ∧ 훽
훤 ⊬ 훴, 훽
(⊬ ∧∙)
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼 ∧ 훽
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼, 훽
(⊬ ∨)
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼 ∨ 훽
훤, 훼 ⊬ 훴
(∙∨ ⊬)
훤, 훼 ∨ 훽 ⊬ 훴
훤, 훽 ⊬ 훴
(∨∙ ⊬)
훤, 훼 ∨ 훽 ⊬ 훴
훤,훼 ⊬ 훴, 훽
(⊬→)
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼→ 훽
훤 ⊬ 훴,훼
(∙ →⊬)
훤, 훼→ 훽 ⊬ 훴
훤, 훽 ⊬ 훴
(→ ∙ ⊬)
훤, 훼→ 훽 ⊬ 훴
Fig. 1. Inference rules of the antisequent calculus AC .
The above observation is not very astounding, since, to verify 훤 ⊬ 훥 we
could alternatively guess assignments to the propositional variables in 훤 and 훥
and thereby verify antisequents in NP.
We now turn to the residual calculus RC of Bonatti and Olivetti [5]. Its
objects are residual sequents ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 and residual antisequents ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥
where 푊,훥 ⊆ ℒ and 푅 ⊆ ℒres . The intuitive meaning is that 훥 does (respec-
tively does not) follow from 푊 using the residues 푅. The rules of RC comprise
of the inference rules from Fig. 2 together with the rules of LK and AC . How-
ever, the use of rules from LK and AC is restricted to purely propositional
(anti)sequents. For this calculus, Bonatti and Olivetti [5] showed:
훤 ⊢ 훥(Re1)
훤, 훼
훾
⊢ 훥
훤 ⊢ 훼 훤, 훾 ⊢ 훥
(Re2)
훤, 훼
훾
⊢ 훥
훤 ∕⊢ 훥 훤 ∕⊢ 훼
(Re3)
훤, 훼
훾
∕⊢ 훥
훤, 훾 ∕⊢ 훥
(Re4)
훤, 훼
훾
∕⊢ 훥
Fig. 2. Inference rules of the residual calculus RC .
Theorem 6 (Bonatti, Olivetti [5]). The residual calculus RC is sound and
complete, i.e., for all default theories ⟨푊,푅⟩ with 푅 ⊆ ℒres and all 훥 ⊆ ℒ,
1. ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 is derivable in RC if and only if ⋁훥 ∈ 퐶푙(푊,푅);
2. ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥 is derivable in RC if and only if ⋁훥 /∈ 퐶푙(푊,푅).
To bound the lengths of proofs in this calculus we exploit the property that
residues only have to be used at a certain level and are not used to deduce any
formulae afterwards (cf. Lemma 3). Using this we prove that the complexity of
RC is tightly linked to that of LK .
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Lemma 7. There exist a polynomial 푝 and a constant 푐 such that 푠RC (푛) ≤
푝(푛) ⋅ 푠LK (푐푛) and 푡RC (푛) ≤ 푝(푛) ⋅ 푡LK (푐푛).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. First we will show the bounds stated
above for sequents. In the second part we will then show that antisequents even
admit polynomial-size proofs in RC .
Assume ﬁrst that we want to derive the sequent ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥, where푊,훥 ⊆ ℒ
and 푅 = {푟1, . . . , 푟푘} is a set of residues with 푟푖 = 훼푖훾푖 . Let 푅′ ⊆ 푅 be minimal
with respect to the size ∣푅′∣ such that ⟨푊,푅′⟩ ⊢ 훥. We may w.l.o.g. assume
that 푅′ = {푟1, . . . , 푟푘′} and 푘′ ≤ 푘. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, we may assume
that the rules 푟푖 are ordered in the way they are applied when computing the
sets 퐶푖. In particular, this means that for each 푖 = 1, . . . , 푘
′,
푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푖−1} ⊢ 훼푖
is a true propositional sequent for which we ﬁx an LK -proof 훱푖. We augment
훱푖 by 푘
′ − 푖 applications of rule (Re1) to obtain
⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푖−1}, {푟푖+1, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훼푖 .
Let us call the proof of this sequent 훱 ′푖.
The proof tree depicted in Fig. 3 for deriving ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 unfurls as follows.
We start with an LK -proof for the sequent 푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푘′} ⊢ 훥 and then
apply 푘′-times the rule (Re2) in the step
⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푖−1}, {푟푖+1, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훼푖 ⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푖}, {푟푖+1, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훥
⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푖−1}, {푟푖, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훥
to reach ⟨푊,푅′⟩ ⊢ 훥. To derive the left prerequisite we use the proof 훱 ′푖. Finally
we use 푘 − 푘′ applications of the rule (Re1) to get ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥.
Π ′1
Π ′2
Π ′푘′ ⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, . . . , 훾푘′}, ∅⟩ ⊢ 훥
(Re2)
...
⟨푊 ∪ {훾1, 훾2}, {푟3, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훥
(Re2)⟨푊 ∪ {훾1}, {푟2, . . . , 푟푘′}⟩ ⊢ 훥
(Re2)⟨푊,푅′⟩ ⊢ 훥
(Re1)
...
⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥
Fig. 3. Proof tree for the sequent ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 in the residual calculus.
Our proof for ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 uses at most (푘′ + 1) ⋅ 푡LK (푛) + 푘
′(푘′+1)
2 + 푘
steps, i.e., 푡RC (푛) ≤ 풪(푛 ⋅ 푡LK (푛) + 푛2). Each sequent is of linear size. Hence,
푠RC (푛) ≤ 푝(푛) ⋅ 푠LK (푛) for some polynomial 푝.
In the second part of the proof we have to show that any true antisequent
has an RC -proof of polynomial size, thus concluding the proof. Let ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥
be the antisequent we wish to prove. Again, let 푅 = {푟1, . . . , 푟푘} with 푟푖 = 훼푖훾푖 ,
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and let {푖1, . . . , 푖ℓ} = 퐼 ⊆ {1, . . . , 푘} be a set of maximal cardinality such that〈
푊 ∪∪푖∈퐼{훾푖}〉 ⊬ 훥 and let 퐼 ′ = {푖ℓ+1, . . . , 푖푘} = {1, . . . , 푘} ∖ 퐼.
Because of ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥, the set 퐼 contains all indices 푖 with 훼푖 ∈ 퐶푙(푊 ).
Therefore, for each 푗 ∈ 퐼 ′ we have 푊 ∪ ∪푖∈퐼{훾푖} ⊬ 훼푗 . We ﬁx a polynomial-
size AC -proof 훱푗 of this antisequent. Augmenting these proofs with ℓ appli-
cations of (Re4) we obtain a proof 훱 ′푗 of
〈
푊,
∪
푖∈퐼{푟푖}
〉
⊬ 훼푗 . Similarly, as〈
푊 ∪∪푖∈퐼{훾푖}〉 ⊬ 훥 we get a polynomial-size proof훱 ′푘+1 of 〈푊,∪푖∈퐼{푟푖}〉 ⊬ 훥.
Now, the proof for ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥 ends with the following application of (Re3)〈
푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푘−1}
〉
⊬ 훥
〈
푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푘−1}
〉
⊬ 훼푖푘
⟨푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푘}⟩ ⊬ 훥
More generally, for all choices of 푠, 푡 with ℓ < 푠 < 푡 ≤ 푘 + 1 we use the (Re3)-
step 〈
푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푠−1}
〉
⊬ 훼푖푡
〈
푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푠−1}
〉
⊬ 훼푖푠
⟨푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖푠}⟩ ⊬ 훼푖푡
where we set 훼푘+1 =
⋁
훥. After all these steps, it remains to derive the an-
tisequents ⟨푊, {푟푖1 , . . . , 푟푖ℓ}⟩ ⊬ 훼푖푡 for ℓ < 푡 ≤ 푘 + 1. But for these we have
already built the proofs 훱 ′푡. Therefore, we have constructed an RC -proof of
⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥 which apart from the AC -proofs 훱 ′푡 uses only 풪(푘2) applications of
(Re3) and (Re4). As each antisequent in the proof is of linear size, we obtain
a polynomial-size RC -proof of ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥. ⊓⊔
Let us remark that while the RC -proof of ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊢ 훥 in Fig. 3 is tree-like,
this is not true for our dag-like RC -proof of ⟨푊,푅⟩ ⊬ 훥 constructed in the
second part of the proof of Lemma 7.
4 Proof Complexity of Credulous Default Reasoning
Now we turn to the analysis of Bonatti and Olivetti’s calculus for credulous
default reasoning. An essential ingredient of the calculus are provability con-
straints which resemble a necessity modality. Provability constraints are of the
form L훼 or ¬L훼 with 훼 ∈ ℒ. A set 퐸 ⊆ ℒ satisﬁes a constraint L훼 if 훼 ∈ 푇ℎ(퐸).
Similarly, 퐸 satisﬁes ¬L훼 if 훼 ∕∈ 푇ℎ(퐸).
We can now describe the calculus BOcred of Bonatti and Olivetti [5] for
credulous default reasoning. A credulous default sequent is a 3-tuple ⟨훴,훤,훥⟩,
denoted by 훴;훤 ∣∼훥, where 훤 = ⟨푊,퐷⟩ is a default theory, 훴 is a set of
provability constraints and 훥 is a set of propositional sentences. Semantically,
the sequent 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 is true, if there exists a stable extension 퐸 of 훤 which
satisﬁes all of the constraints in 훴 and
⋁
훥 ∈ 퐸. The calculus BOcred uses such
sequents and extends LK , AC , and RC by the inference rules in Fig. 4.
For this calculus Bonatti and Olivetti [5] show the following:
Theorem 8 (Bonatti, Olivetti [5]). BOcred is sound and complete, i.e., a
credulous default sequent is true if and only if it is derivable in BOcred .
We now investigate lengths of proofs in BOcred . Our next lemma shows that
upper bounds on the proof size of RC can be transferred to BOcred .
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훤 ⊢ 훥(cD1)
; 훤 ∣∼훥
훤 ⊢ 훼 훴; 훤 ∣∼훥
(cD2)
L훼, 훴; 훤 ∣∼훥
훤 ∕⊢ 훼 훴; 훤 ∣∼훥
(cD3) ¬L훼, 훴; 훤 ∣∼훥
where 훤 ⊆ ℒres in rules (cD1), (cD2), and (cD3)
L¬훽푖, 훴; 훤 ∣∼훥
(cD4)
훴; 훤, 훼: 훽1...훽푛
훾
∣∼훥
¬L¬훽1 . . .¬L¬훽푛, 훴; 훤, 훼훾 ∣∼훥
(cD5)
훴; 훤, 훼: 훽1...훽푛
훾
∣∼훥
Fig. 4. Inference rules for the credulous default calculus BOcred .
Lemma 9. For any function 푡(푛), if RC is 푡(푛)-bounded, then BOcred is 푝(푛) ⋅
푡(푛)-bounded for some polynomial 푝. The same relation holds for the number of
steps in RC and BOcred .
Proof. Let 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 be a true credulous default sequent. We will construct a
BOcred -derivation of 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 starting from the bottom with the given sequent.
Observe that we cannot use any of the rules (cD1) through (cD3) as long
as 훤 contains proper defaults with nonempty justiﬁcation. Thus we ﬁrst have
to reduce all defaults to residues plus some set of constraints using (cD4) or
(cD5). As one of these rules has to be applied exactly once for each appearance
of some default in 훤 we end up with 훴′;훤 ′∣∼훥, where ∣훴′∣ is polynomial in
∣훤 ∪훴∣ and 훤 ′ is equal to 훤 on its propositional part and contains some of the
corresponding residues instead of the defaults from 훤 . From this point on we
can only use rules (cD2) and (cD3) until we have eliminated all constraints
and then ﬁnally apply rule (cD1) once. Thus, BOcred -proofs look as shown in
Fig. 5 where RC indicates a derivation in the residual calculus and 휎 is the
RC
RC
RC
(cD1)
훤 ′∣∼훥
(cD2) or (cD3)
휎;훤 ′∣∼훥
(cD2) or (cD3)
...
훴′′;훤 ′∣∼훥
(cD2) or (cD3)
훴′;훤 ′∣∼훥
(cD4) or (cD5)
...
훴;훤 ∣∼훥
Fig. 5. The structure of the BOcred -proof in Lemma 9
remaining constraint from 훴 after applications of (cD2) or (cD3). Hence we
obtain the bounds on 푠BOcred and 푡BOcred . ⊓⊔
Combining Lemmas 7 and 9 we obtain our main result in this section stating
a tight connection between the proof complexity of LK and BOcred .
Theorem 10. There exist a polynomial 푝 and a constant 푐 such that 푠LK (푛) ≤
푠BOcred (푛) ≤ 푝(푛) ⋅ 푠LK (푐푛) and 푡LK (푛) ≤ 푡BOcred (푛) ≤ 푝(푛) ⋅ 푡LK (푐푛).
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In the light of this result, proving either non-trivial lower or upper bounds to
the proof size of BOcred seems very diﬃcult—as such a result would mean a
major breakthrough in propositional proof complexity (cf. [4, 18]).
4.1 On the Automatizability of BOcred
Practitioners are not only interested in the size of a proof, but face the more
complicated problem to actually construct a proof for a given instance. Of
course, in the presence of super-polynomial lower bounds to the proof size this
cannot be done in polynomial time. Thus, in proof search the best one can hope
for is the following notion of automatizability:
Deﬁnition 11 (Bonet, Pitassi, Raz [7]). A proof system 푃 for a language
퐿 is automatizable if there exists a deterministic procedure that takes as input
a string 푥 and outputs a 푃 -proof of 푥 in time polynomial in the size of the
shortest 푃 -proof of 푥 if 푥 ∈ 퐿. If 푥 ∕∈ 퐿, then the behavior of the algorithm is
unspeciﬁed.
For practical purposes automatizable proof systems would be very desirable.
Searching for a proof we may not ﬁnd the shortest one, but we are guaranteed
to ﬁnd one that is only polynomially longer. Unfortunately, for BOcred there
are strong limitations towards this goal as our next result shows:
Theorem 12. BOcred is not automatizable unless factoring integers is possible
in polynomial time.
Proof. First we observe that automatizability of BOcred implies automatizabil-
ity of Frege systems. For this let 휑 be a propositional tautology. By assump-
tion, we can construct a BOcred -proof of ∅∣∼휑. This BOcred -proof contains an
LK -proof of ∅ ⊢ 휑 by rule (cD1). As LK is polynomially equivalent to Frege
systems [18], we can construct from this LK -proof a Frege proof of 휑 in poly-
nomial time. By a result of Bonet, Pitassi, and Raz [7], Frege systems are not
automatizable unless Blum integers can be factored in polynomial time (a Blum
integer is the product of two primes which are both congruent 3 modulo 4). ⊓⊔
4.2 A General Construction of Proof Systems for Credulous
Default Reasoning
In this section we will explain a general method how to construct proof systems
for credulous default reasoning. These proof systems arise from the canonical
Σp2 algorithm for credulous default reasoning (Algorithm 1). Algorithm 1 ﬁrst
guesses a generating set 퐺ext for a potential stable extension and then veriﬁes by
the stage construction from Theorem 1 that 퐺ext indeed generates a stable ex-
tension which moreover contains the formula 휑. Algorithm 1 is a Σp2 procedure,
i.e., it can be executed by a nondeterministic polynomial-time Turing machine
푀 with access to a coNP-oracle. The nondeterminism solely lies in line 1 and
the oracle queries are made in lines 6 and 11 to the coNP-complete problem of
propositional implication IMP = {⟨훹, 휑⟩ ∣ 훹 ⊆ ℒ, 휑 ∈ ℒ, and 훹 ∣= 휑}.
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Algorithm 1 A Σp2 procedure for credulous default reasoning
Require: ⟨푊,퐷⟩, 휑
1: guess 퐷0 ⊆ 퐷 and let 퐺ext ←푊 ∪
{
훾 ∣ 훼:훽
훾
∈ 퐷0
}
2: 퐺new ←푊
3: repeat
4: 퐺old ← 퐺new
5: for all 훼:훽
훾
∈ 퐷 do
6: if 퐺old ∣= 훼 and 퐺ext ∕∣= ¬훽 then
7: 퐺new ← 퐺new ∪ {훾}
8: end if
9: end for
10: until 퐺new = 퐺old
11: if 퐺new = 퐺ext and 퐺ext ∣= 휑 then
12: return true
13: else
14: return false
15: end if
Algorithm 1 can be converted into a proof system for credulous default
reasoning as follows. We ﬁx a propositional proof system 푃 and deﬁne a proof
system Cred(푃 ) for credulous default reasoning where proofs are of the form
⟨푊,퐷,휑, comp, 푞1, . . . , 푞푘, 푎1, . . . , 푎푘⟩ .
Here comp is a computation of 푀 on input ⟨푊,퐷,휑⟩ and 푞1, . . . , 푞푘 are the
queries to IMP during this computation. If the IMP-query 푞푖 = ⟨훹푖, 휑푖⟩ is
answered positively, then 푎푖 is a 푃 -proof of
(⋀
휓∈훹푖 휓
)
→ 휑푖, otherwise 푎푖 is an
assignment falsifying this formula. For this proof system we obtain the following
bounds:
Theorem 13. Let 푃 be a propositional proof system. Then Cred(푃 ) is a proof
system for credulous default reasoning with 푠푃 (푛) ≤ 푠Cred(푃 )(푛) ≤ 풪(푛2푠푃 (푛)).
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality holds because we can use Cred(푃 ) to prove propo-
sitional tautologies 휑 by choosing 푊 = 퐷 = ∅.
For the second inequality, we observe that Algorithm 1 has quadratic run-
ning time. In particular, a computation of Algorithm 1 contains at most a
quadratic number of queries to IMP. Each of these queries is of linear size
because it only consists of formulae from the input. If the query is answered
positively, then we have to supply a 푃 -proof and there exists such a 푃 -proof
of size ≤ 푠푃 (푛). For a negative answer we just include an assignment of linear
size. This yields 푠Cred(푃 )(푛) ≤ 풪(푛2푠푃 (푛)). ⊓⊔
Theorem 13 tells us that proving lower bounds for proof systems for cred-
ulous default reasoning is more or less the same as proving lower bounds to
propositional proof systems. In particular, we get:
Corollary 14. There exists a polynomially bounded proof system for credulous
default reasoning if and only if there exists a polynomially bounded propositional
proof system.
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5 Lower Bounds for Skeptical Default Reasoning
Bonatti and Olivetti [5] introduce two calculi for skeptical default reasoning. As
before, objects are sequents of the form 훴;훤 ∣∼훥, where 훴 is a set of constraints,
훤 is a propositional default theory, and 훥 is a set of propositional formulae. But
now, the sequent 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 is true, if ⋁훥 holds in all extensions of 훤 satisfying
the constraints in 훴.
The ﬁrst calculus BOskep consists of the deﬁning axioms of LK and AC ,
the inference rules of LK , AC , RC , and the rules from Fig. 6. Bonatti and
훤 ⊢ 훥(sD1)
훴;훤 ∣∼훥
훤 ⊢ 훼(sD2) ¬L훼,훴;훤 ∣∼훥
훤 ∕⊢ 훼
(sD3)
L훼,훴;훤 ∣∼훥
where 훤 ⊆ ℒres in rules (sD1), (sD2), and (sD3)
¬L¬훽1, . . . ,¬L¬훽푛, 훴;훤, 훼훾 ∣∼훥 L¬훽1, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 . . . L¬훽푛, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥
(sD4)
훴;훤, 훼:훽1...훽푛
훾
∣∼훥
Fig. 6. Inference rules for the skeptical default calculus BOskep .
Olivetti show that each true sequent is derivable in BOskep , i.e., the calculus is
sound and complete. However, they already remark that proofs in BOskep are
of exponential size in the number of default rules in the sequent. This is due to
the residual rules for they cannot be applied unless all defaults with nonempty
justiﬁcations have been eliminated using rule (sD4).
To get more concise proofs, Bonatti and Olivetti [5] suggest an enhanced
calculus BO ′skep where the rules (sD1) to (sD3) are replaced by rules (sD1
′) to
(sD3′) and rule (sD4) is kept (see Fig. 7). Bonatti and Olivetti prove sound-
ness and completeness for BO ′skep . Moreover, they show that BO
′
skep is exponen-
tially separated from BOskep , i.e., there exist sequents (푆푛)푛≥1 which require
exponential-size proofs in BOskep but have linear-size derivations in BO
′
skep . In
훴′, 훤 ′ ⊢ 훥
(sD1’)
훴;훤 ∣∼훥
훴;훤 ∣∼훼
(sD2’) ¬L훼,훴;훤 ∣∼훥
훤 ′′ ∕⊢ 훼
(sD3’)
L훼,훴;훤 ∣∼훥
¬L¬훽1, . . . ,¬L¬훽푛, 훴;훤, 훼훾 ∣∼훥 L¬훽1, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 . . . L¬훽푛, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥
(sD4)
훴;훤, 훼:훽1...훽푛
훾
∣∼훥
where 훴′ ⊆ {훼 ∣ L훼 ∈ 훴}, 훤 ′ ⊆ 훤 ∩ ℒres , and 훤 ′′ = (훤 ∩ ℒ) ∪
{
푝(훿)
푐(훿)
∣∣∣ 훿 ∈ 훤}.
Fig. 7. Inference rules for the enhanced skeptical default calculus BO ′skep .
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our next result we will show an exponential lower bound to the proof length
(and therefore also to the proof size) in the enhanced skeptical calculus BO ′skep .
Theorem 15. The calculus BO ′skep has exponential lower bounds to the lengths
of proofs. More precisely, there exist sequents 푆푛 of size 풪(푛) such that every
BO ′skep-proof of 푆푛 uses 2
훺(푛) steps. Therefore, 푠BO ′skep (푛), 푡BO
′
skep
(푛) ∈ 2훺(푛).
Proof. We construct a sequence (푆푛)푛≥1 = (훴푛;훤푛∣∼휓푛)푛≥1 such that for some
constant 푐, every BO ′skep-proof of 푆푛 has length at least 2
훺(푛). We choose 훴푛 =
∅, 휓푛 = 퐴2푛, and 훤푛 = ⟨∅, 퐷2푛⟩, where 퐷2푛 consists of the defaults listed in
Fig. 8. The default theory 훤푛 possesses 2
푛+1 stable extensions. Observe that
each of these contains 퐴2푛, but that each pair of stable extensions diﬀers in
truth assigned to the propositional variables 퐴0, . . . , 퐴푛. We claim that every
: 퐴0
퐴0
: ¬퐴0
¬퐴0
퐴0 : 퐴1
퐴1
¬퐴0 : 퐴1
퐴1
퐴0 : ¬퐴1
¬퐴1
¬퐴0 : ¬퐴1
¬퐴1
...
퐴푛−1 : 퐴푛
퐴푛
¬퐴푛−1 : 퐴푛
퐴푛
퐴푛−1 : ¬퐴푛
¬퐴푛
¬퐴푛−1 : ¬퐴푛
¬퐴푛
퐴푛 : 퐴푛−1
퐴푛+1
¬퐴푛 : 퐴푛−1
퐴푛+1
퐴푛 : ¬퐴푛−1
¬퐴푛+1
¬퐴푛 : ¬퐴푛−1
¬퐴푛+1
...
퐴2푛−2 : 퐴1
퐴2푛−1
¬퐴2푛−2 : 퐴1
퐴2푛−1
퐴2푛−2 : ¬퐴1
¬퐴2푛−1
¬퐴2푛−2 : ¬퐴1
¬퐴2푛−1
퐴2푛−1 : 퐴0
퐴2푛
¬퐴2푛−1 : 퐴0
퐴2푛
퐴2푛−1 : ¬퐴0
퐴2푛
¬퐴2푛−1 : ¬퐴0
퐴2푛
Fig. 8. The defaults in 퐷2푛.
proof of 푆푛 has exponential length in 푛. More precisely, we will show that rule
(sD4) has to be applied an exponential number of times.
To this end, let 훱 be a BO ′skep-proof of 퐷2푛∣∼퐴2푛. We claim that if
훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 (1)
is a sequent in 훱 such that 훴 is consistent and there exists an 푖 ∈ {푛+1, . . . , 2푛}
such that 퐷2푛 can be partitioned into three sets 퐼1, 퐼2, 퐼3 satisfying
1. ¬L¬푗(훿) ∈ 훴 and 푝(훿)푐(훿) ∈ 푅 if 훿 ∈ 퐼1,
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2. L¬푗(훿) ∈ 훴 if 훿 ∈ 퐼2,
3. 훿 ∈ 퐷 if 훿 ∈ 퐼3, and
4. {퐴푖,¬퐴푖} ∩ {푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐼1} = ∅,
then 훱 has to contain an application of (sD4) to a default rule deriving 퐴푖 or
¬퐴푖. Intuitively, the set 퐼1 contains those default rules that have been applied,
퐼2 contains those default rules that have been discarded, and 퐼3 contains the
default rules that have not been used yet. Also note that the fourth condition
together with the consistency of 훴 implies that 퐷 still contains default rules
with conclusion 퐴푖 or ¬퐴푖.
To prove this claim, let 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 be a sequent as stated above and
푛 < 푖 ≤ 2푛 be such that {퐴푖,¬퐴푖} ∩ {푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐼1} = ∅. Suppose that
훱 does not contain any applications of (sD4) to default rules deriving 퐴푖 or
¬퐴푖. Consequently, 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 is derived by applications of (sD1’), (sD2’),
(sD3’) or (sD4) to a default rules not deriving 퐴푖 or ¬퐴푖. We distinguish
among the rule which has been applied to derive (1).
(sD1’) Suppose 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 were derived by an application of (sD1’), then
훱 had to contain the predecessor 훴′, 푅 ⊢ 퐴2푛, where 훴′ ⊆ {퐴푘,¬퐴푘 ∣ 0 ≤
푘 ≤ 푛}. By the fourth condition, {퐴푖,¬퐴푖} ∩ {푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐼1} = ∅. Hence,
푅 cannot contain any of the residual rules 훼푖−1훼푖 with 훼푖 ∈ {퐴푖,¬퐴푖}. As 훼푖
does not occur anywhere else in 훴′, 푅, the sequent 훴′;푅∣∼퐴2푛 cannot be
closed.
(sD2’) If 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 were derived by an application of (sD2’), then 훱 had
to contain the predecessor 훴′;퐷,푅∣∼훼푘, where 훼푘 ∈ {퐴푘,¬퐴푘} with 0 ≤
푘 ≤ 푛 and 훴′ := 훴 ∖ {¬L훼푘} (notice that we identify ¬¬퐴푖 and 퐴푖 for
simplicity of notation). Suppose that both the sequent 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 and
its predecessor 훴′;퐷,푅∣∼훼푘 were true. Then ¬L훼푘 ∈ 훴 implies that there
exists a stable extension not containing 훼푘, whereas 훴
′;퐷,푅∣∼훼푘 asserts
that all stable extensions of 퐷,푅 contain 훼푘. From the correctness of BO
′
skep
and the consistency of 훴 ⊇ 훴′ we thus obtain a contradiction to the validity
of 훴′;퐷,푅∣∼훼푘.
(sD3’) Similarly, if the sequent 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 were derived by an application of
the rule (sD3’), then 훱 contained the sequent 퐷′′, 푅 ⊬ 훼푙 for some 훼푙 such
that L훼푙 ∈ 훴, where 퐷′′ =
{
푝(훿)
푐(훿)
∣∣∣ 훿 ∈ 퐷}. Here the set 퐷′′ is a superset
of the residues of the generating defaults of any stable extension satisfying
the proof constraints in 훴; hence any sentence that does not follow from
퐷′′ cannot belong to these stable extensions. By the correctness of BO ′skep ,
the ability to prove 퐷′′, 푅 ⊬ 훼푙 would thus imply that no stable extension of
훤푛 satisﬁes L훼푙. Yet, 훤푛 has a stable extension satisfying any consistent set
of proof constraints formed over the propositions in {퐴푖,¬퐴푖 ∣ 0 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛}.
Thus, by the correctness of BO ′skep , 퐷
′′, 푅 ⊬ 훼푙 cannot be closed.
(sD4) Suppose that 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 is derived by an application of (sD4) to
the default rule
훼푘−1:훼푙
훼푘
∈ 퐷 with 푛 < 푘 ∕= 푖 and 푙 ∈ {푘, 2푛 − 푘}. Let
퐷′ := 퐷 ∖ {훼푘−1:훼푙훼푘 }. Then 훱 contains the two ancestor sequents
훴,¬L¬훼푙;퐷′, 푅, 훼푘−1
훼푘
∣∼퐴2푛 and 훴,L¬훼푙;퐷′, 푅∣∼퐴2푛 .
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But neither of these sequents contains a residual rule deriving 퐴푖 or ¬퐴푖,
while both contain less default rules. Thus iterating this argument until no
default rules deriving 퐴푗 or ¬퐴푗 for 푗 ∕= 푖 remain yields a contradiction.
Concluding, the containment of 훴;퐷,푅∣∼퐴2푛 in 훱 enforces an application
of (sD4) to a default rule 훿 with conclusion 퐴푖 or ¬퐴푖. This yields the ances-
tor sequents 훴,¬L¬훼2푛−푖;퐷′, 푅, 훼푖−1훼푖 ∣∼퐴2푛 and 훴,L¬훼2푛−푖;퐷′, 푅∣∼퐴2푛, where
퐷′ := 퐷 ∖ {훿}. The latter of these still satisﬁes the requirements of (1). Thus,
by the same arguments as above, 훱 has to contain an application of (sD4) (to
a default rule 훼푖−1:¬훼2푛−푖¬훼푖 ). Each of these applications of (sD4) yields a sequent
satisfying (1) unless for these {퐴푖,¬퐴푖} ∩ {푐(훿) ∣ 훿 ∈ 퐼1} ∕= ∅ holds for all
푛 < 푖 ≤ 2푛; these sequents do, in particular, possess diﬀerent proof constraints.
Summing up, to prove 퐷2푛∣∼퐴2푛, 훱 has to contain 22푛−푖+1 applications of
(sD4) to default rules with conclusion 퐴푖 or ¬퐴푖. Therefore, every proof of 푆푛
has length at least 2훺(푛). ⊓⊔
We point out that the above argument does not only work against tree-like
proofs, but also rules out the possibility of sub-exponential dag-like derivations
for 퐷2푛∣∼퐴2푛. The lower bound is obtained from the fact that to derive 퐴2푛,
we have to derive a residual rules concluding 퐴푖 and a residual rule concluding
¬퐴푖, for each 푛 < 푖 ≤ 2푛. These can, by construction of 훤푛, only be obtained
from ancestors with mutually diﬀerent proof constraints and, in turn, implies
mutually disjoint sets of ancestor sequents.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that with respect to lengths of proofs, proof systems
for credulous default reasoning and for propositional logic are very close to
each other. Although deciding credulous default sequents is presumably harder
than deciding tautologies (the former is Σp2-complete [14], while the latter is
complete for coNP), the diﬀerence disappears when we want to prove these
objects (Sect. 4.2).
For skeptical reasoning this is less clear. While skeptical default reasoning
has polynomially bounded proof systems if and only if this holds for TAUT, we
leave open whether this equivalence extends to other bounds. However, in the
light of our exponential lower bound for BO ′skep (Theorem 15), searching for
natural proof systems for skeptical default reasoning with more concise proofs
will be a rewarding task for future research.
In this direction Bonatti and Olivetti [5] themselves introduced two rules to
supplement their enhanced calculus. These are the cut rule
훴;훤 ∣∼훼 훴;훤, 훼∣∼훥
(Cut)
훴;훤 ∣∼훥
and the following version of the rule (sD4)
훴0, 훴;훤,
훼
훾
∣∼훥 훴1, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥 . . . 훴푛, 훴;훤 ∣∼훥
(sD4′)
훴;훤, 훼:훽1...훽푛훾 ∣∼훥
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where 훴푖 = L¬훽휋(푖),¬L¬훽휋(푖+1), . . . ,¬L¬훽휋(푛) for an arbitrary permutation 휋
of {1, . . . , 푛}. While it is not hard to see that our lower bound in Theorem 15
still remains true if we add (sD4′) to BO ′skep , we leave open the problem to
show super-polynomial lower bounds in the presence of the cut rule.
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